Solution concept

Results: 378



#Item
171

PnS Concept annonce la sortie de la version 3 de la solution ConfidenceMail PnS ConfidenceMail est le moteur des solutions collaboratives d’échanges sécurisées de PnS Concept. Elle fournit des services collaboratifs

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.pnsconcept.fr

Language: French - Date: 2012-09-14 11:08:21
    172Sequential equilibrium / Bayesian game / Extensive-form game / Nash equilibrium / Rationalizability / Self-confirming equilibrium / Solution concept / Normal-form game / Strategy / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

    Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction * Running Title: Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.dklevine.com

    Language: English - Date: 2001-06-16 12:14:50
    173Normal-form game / Solution concept / Complete information / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Outcome / Coordination game / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Subgame / Oligopoly / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

    Economics Working Paper Series[removed]Innovation in a generalized timing game Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: ses.library.usyd.edu.au

    Language: English - Date: 2013-08-27 12:52:24
    174Self-confirming equilibrium / Solution concept / Nash equilibrium / Rationalizability / David K. Levine / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Macroeconomic model / Information set / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

    Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First Version: January 14, 2007, This Version: August 6, 2007 Prepared for the Conference in Honor of Robert E. Lucas Jr. Abstract:

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.dklevine.com

    Language: English - Date: 2007-08-06 13:08:05
    175Subgame perfect equilibrium / Solution concept / Bargaining problem / Mechanism design / Ordinal number / Game theory / Problem solving / Nash equilibrium

    Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game1 David K. Levine2 March 18, 1995 © This document is copyrighted by the author. You may freely reproduce and distribute it electronically or in print, provided it is dist

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.dklevine.com

    Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:20:24
    176Solution concept / Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Rationalizability / Normal-form game / Strategic dominance / Strategy / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Information set / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Self-confirming equilibrium

    Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium1 First version: April 25, 1995 This revision: July 12, 1999 Eddie Dekel

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.dklevine.com

    Language: English - Date: 1999-07-12 13:09:31
    177Decision theory / Quantal response equilibrium / Bargaining / Nash equilibrium / David K. Levine / Drew Fudenberg / Self-confirming equilibrium / Solution concept / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Game theory / Economics / Problem solving

    Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? The ordinary versus the extraordinary1 Max Weber Lecture June 8, 2009 David K. Levine2

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.dklevine.com

    Language: English - Date: 2009-06-24 13:21:07
    178Self-confirming equilibrium / Nash equilibrium / Bayesian game / Extensive-form game / Strategy / Solution concept / Strategic dominance / Best response / The Intuitive Criterion / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

    Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.dklevine.com

    Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39
    179Nash equilibrium / Subgame / Strategy / Information set / Bayesian game / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Solution concept

    Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.dklevine.com

    Language: English - Date: 2005-07-18 17:35:40
    180Science / Drew Fudenberg / Self-confirming equilibrium / David K. Levine / Fictitious play / Nash equilibrium / Solution concept / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

    An Economist’s Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 5, 2006 In their wide-ranging and provocative discussion, Shoham, Powers and Grenager (SPG) survey several large literatu

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.dklevine.com

    Language: English - Date: 2006-10-05 10:44:53
    UPDATE